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Abstract
The authors estimate and solve a small structural model for the euro area over the 1983–2000
period. Given the assumption of rational expectations, the model implies a set of orthogonality
conditions that provide the basis for estimating the model’s parameter by generalized method of
moments. The authors’ main results are: (i) the impulse-response functions implied by the model
are consistent with the standard stylized facts about the dynamic effects of monetary policy, (ii)
evidence suggests that ﬂexibility in Europe has increased since the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty, and (iii) the inﬂation expectations captured by the model might explain the European
Central Bank’s reluctance to ease monetary conditions in 2000.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31
Bank classiﬁcation: Transmission of monetary policy
Résumé
Les auteurs estiment et résolvent un petit modèle structurel applicable à la zone euro pour la
période comprise entre 1983 et 2000. Partant de l’hypothèse d’attentes rationnelles, le modèle
impose un ensemble de conditions d’orthogonalité qui permettent d’en estimer les paramètres à
l’aide de la méthode des moments généralisés. Les auteurs en concluent essentiellement que i) les
proﬁls de réaction générés par le modèle cadrent avec les faits stylisés relatifs aux effets
dynamiques de la politique monétaire; ii) la ﬂexibilité semble s’être accentuée en Europe depuis
l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Maastricht; iii) les attentes d’inﬂation représentées dans le modèle
peuvent expliquer l’hésitation de la Banque centrale européenne à assouplir les conditions
monétaires en 2000.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Transmission de la politique monétaire1
1. Introduction
With the adoption of the euro in January 1999, a euro-area model has become a sine qua non
condition by which to evaluate the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). An
initial question for us was whether a model with strong theoretical foundations but possibly
limited forecasting ability was preferable to a good forecasting model with an undeﬁned structure.
Given the availability of indicator models that can forecast fairly well, we decided to put more
weight on analytical rigour in designing our model. We chose a New Keynesian (NK) approach,
which has solid theoretical foundations based on optimizing rational consumers and ﬁrms in a
highly aggregated framework.
To our knowledge, few models have been built so far for the euro area. Coenen, Levin, and
Wieland (2001) assess the role of money to forecast output in a small rational-expectations
framework. Coenen, Levin, and Wieland (2000) estimate a small model of the euro area “used as
a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies.” Fagan,
Henry, and Mestre (2001) manage to build a medium-sized model detailed enough to include
agents’ behaviour separately. The goals of this paper are to estimate a small NK model, extract the
inﬂation expectations it captures, and search for evidence of increased ﬂexibility in Europe since
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.
The NK approach is widely used in monetary policy analysis, since it is designed to describe the
behaviour of economy-wide variables that enter into most monetary policy discussions. The
baseline macroeconomic framework is a dynamic general-equilibrium model with money,
nominal price rigidities, and rational expectations. In this model, monetary policy affects the real
economy in the short run as in the traditional Keynesian IS/LM framework. The NK approach is
appealing because the aggregated behavioural equations are the outcome of optimizing
households and ﬁrms, in keeping with the most recent advances in modern macroeconomics.
According to the consensus view among central bankers and monetary economists, a
contractionary monetary shock raises unemployment, at least temporarily, and leads to a delayed
and gradual fall in inﬂation. Mankiw (2000) discusses the inability of NK models both to generate
the degree of inﬂation persistence observed in the data and to replicate empirically plausible
impulse-response functions to monetary policy shocks. We follow Amato and Laubach (2001),
allowing for a fraction of ﬁrms to use backward-looking rules-of-thumb to set prices. This leads to
endogenous persistence in inﬂation and estimated impulse-response functions that replicate the
consensus view fairly well.2
Typically, in the empirical applications of these models, the forward-looking part is solved by
assuming perfect foresight, using consensus forecasts (e.g., Rudebusch 2000), or using forecasts
derived from a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) (Sbordone 2000; Galí and Gertler 1999).
We solve our forward-looking model as a rational-expectations model following Fair and Taylor
(1983). This allows us to examine the impacts of various shocks via changes on agents’
expectations, which, to our knowledge, has not yet been done in the empirical literature.
Other contributions of this paper are: (i) we ﬁnd evidence to suggest that ﬂexibility in Europe has
increased since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, (ii) in contrast with some recent empirical
work based on a forward-looking model, we ﬁnd that excess demand (as measured by the output
gap) leads to higher inﬂation, and (iii) the inﬂation expectations captured by our model might
explain the recent reluctance of the ECB to ease monetary conditions.
Section 2 brieﬂy describes the NK approach. In section 3, we expose how the model is estimated
and solved. We also present the results and the model ﬁt, and analyze the impulse responses.
Section 4 concludes.
2. An Overview of the New Keynesian Approach
In the NK approach, the baseline macroeconomic framework is a dynamic general-equilibrium
model with money, nominal price rigidities, and rational expectations. In this model, households
maximize their expected utility under a budgetary constraint. Production is divided into two
sectors: a perfectly competitive ﬁnal-good sector, which aggregates all intermediate goods and
converts them into a homogeneous ﬁnal good, and a monopolistically competitive intermediate-
goods sector. Given the demand from the ﬁnal-good sector, each ﬁrm in the intermediate-goods
sector produces a unique product optimally.
For monetary policy to have a role, price rigidities are required. They are introduced by assuming
frictions to price adjustment on the part of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. Since ﬁrms know that
their prices may be sticky in future periods, they will consider future market conditions when they
set their current prices.
We don’t explicitly derive these optimal behavioural equations, borrowing speciﬁcations from the
existing literature.1 Instead, we present a baseline model that, despite its simplicity, contains the
main ingredients of richer frameworks that have been used for policy analysis. It consists of two
1. Clarida,Galí,andGertler(1999),andparticularlyKing(2000),giveanexcellentexpositionoftheNK
perspective, from which this section is inspired.3
optimal behavioural equations: a Phillips curve that links inﬂation to the output gap, and an IS
curve that relates output inversely to the real interest rate. The model is closed by specifying a
reaction function for the monetary authorities.
2.1 The Phillips curve
The traditional backward-looking Phillips curve is probably less relevant in today’s world, in
which monetary authorities increasingly have credible inﬂation targets. Nevertheless, many
studies ﬁnd support for a strictly backward-looking equation. For example, Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) ﬁnd that a traditional Phillips curve can explain most of the inﬂation that
occurred in the United States over the 1960–99 period. Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001)
obtain similar results for the euro area over the period 1970–98. Despite its apparent empirical
success, however, the traditional Phillips curve seems to have had a tendency recently to over-
predict inﬂation (as noted in particular by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido 2001), possibly because
it lacks a forward-looking component.
In the NK framework, the non-neutrality of monetary policy results from assuming frictions to
price adjustment on the part of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. In these models, pricing decisions
are optimal given the assumed frictions to price adjustment (based on overlapping contracts in
Taylor 1979, convex costs of adjusting prices, or a probability of price adjustment in Calvo 1983).
At the aggregate level, this framework provides a relationship between current inﬂation, the
current output gap, and expected future inﬂation.
The supply side of the economy is thus summarized by a Phillips curve as described by equation
(1), where  is the inﬂation rate and  is the output gap. The equation represents a loglinear
approximation around the steady-state aggregation of individual ﬁrms’ pricing decisions2:
. (1)
The larger is , the stronger is the adjustment of prices to deviations of output from its potential
(or the more ﬂexible are prices).3
2. Equation (1) can also be described as an aggregate supply curve by replacing the current inﬂation rate
withitsdeﬁnitionintermsofthechangeinpricesbetweenperiodtandt-1.Thisyieldsanequationthat
explains how the aggregate supply depends on current prices and other factors.
3. We shouldexpect thatarigidlabour marketinwhichwage-settingmechanisms arenotmarket-driven
will be reﬂected in a lowa.In section 3.1, we do rolling regressions to determine whether there is
evidence that the euro area has become more ﬂexiblein recent years withthe convergence efforts and
thesubsequentadoptionoftheeuro.Usingameasureofrealmarginalcostinsteadoftheoutputgapin
their Phillips curve speciﬁcation, Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) ﬁnd that prices are more
ﬂexible inthe U.S. economy than in the euro area over the 1970–98 period.
pt xt
pt bEtpt 1 + apxt + =
ap4
These models are distinguished by the absence of lagged variables in the structural equations.
Inﬂation dynamics are entirely explained by the current output gap and expected future inﬂation.
This might account for the difﬁculty in using these models to replicate the strong serial correlation
typically found in both output-gap and inﬂation data.
Amato and Laubach (2001) allow for the possibility that a fraction of ﬁrms use backward-looking
rules-of-thumb to set prices. This leads to endogenous persistence in inﬂation:
. (2)
By iterating equation (2) forward, we easily see that inﬂation depends entirely on past inﬂation
and on current and expected future economic conditions.
In the steady state, inﬂation is constant. We can thus, from (2), express output as a function of
steady-state inﬂation as follows:
, (3)
where  is real output and  is potential output. The long-run slope of the Phillips curve,
, measures the response of output to changes in the long-run rate of inﬂation, after
the economy has made a transition from one inﬂationary steady state to another. With
close to unity, equation (3) implies that there is a negligible long-run trade-off between inﬂation
and output. As expected by the mainstream theory, King and Wolman (1996) suggest that the
long-run effect of inﬂation on output is very small.4 We will therefore assume in our model that
there is no long-run trade-off between real output and inﬂation; i.e., that . The
Phillips curve will be speciﬁed as:
, (4)
where . For , actual inﬂation is a function of the current output gap, as well
as expected and past inﬂation.
There is no consensus in the literature over the degree of “forward-lookingness” in the
determination of inﬂation. It is possible to derive an equation with  from the models of
4. The mainstream assumption of long-run monetary neutrality is questioned by Mankiw (2000), but it
remains very plausible.
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price-setting behaviour (see Roberts 1995), but many authors assume that there is some inertia in
inﬂation, so  should be less than 1 (Svensson 1997; Fuhrer and Moore 1995; Fuhrer 1997).
Rudebusch (2000) gives empirical evidence that the value of for the United States lies between
0 and 0.6. This represents quite well the range of estimates provided by various researchers. For
example, Fuhrer (1997) ﬁnds that backward-looking behaviour explains more than 75 per cent of
the variation in U.S. inﬂation, but he also does not reject the possibility that the forward-looking
component is statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. Some others ﬁnd higher estimates of
 (see, for example, the estimates of Chadha, Masson, and Meredith 1992; Brayton et al. 1997;
and Gagnon and Khan 2001).
2.2  The IS curve
The demand side of the economy is obtained by linearizing the Euler consumption equation that
results from the households’ optimal saving decision in a closed economy with a government but
no investment.5 The standard NK IS curve is illustrated in equation (5), where  is the output
gap, the inﬂation rate, the equilibrium real interest rate, and the 3-month nominal interest
rate:
. (5)
Amato and Laubach (2001) consider both forward-looking and rule-of-thumb consumers. Rule-
of-thumb consumers are also forward looking, but act with a delay of one period (i.e., they base
their forward-looking expectations on information available in the previous period). Such
behaviour leads to endogenous persistence in output:
. (6)
Equation (6) implies a negative relationship between real ex ante interest rates and the current
output gap, everything else being equal.6 The difference with the traditional IS curve is that the
current output now depends both on past and expected output.
The negative effect of real interest rates on consumption reﬂects intertemporal substitution. Many
economists would argue that the long-term interest rate is more relevant for aggregate demand
5. A closed economy is a reasonable approximation, given that the domestic economy is about 80 per
cent of European GDP.
6. TheFisherequationisimplicitlyimposedin(6),becausetherealinterestrateisdeﬁnedasthenominal
interest rate minus the rate of inﬂation that isexpected to prevail betweent andt+1. This speciﬁcation
of the Fisher equation omits any inﬂation-risk premium in the nominal interest rate (see McCallum
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than the short-term interest rate. The NK IS curve can accommodate this view. By iterating
equation (5) or (6) forward, it is easy to show that output is a function of the sum of current and
expected short-term interest rates, which will be reﬂected in the long-term interest rate under the
pure term-structure hypothesis. The coefﬁcient associated with the long-term interest rate will be
greater than g, since it includes the inﬂuence of expected future output. This explains why the
long-term interest rate is more important than the short-term interest rate in a traditional IS curve
that omits expected output.
2.3 The monetary policy reaction function
The NK IS/LM model differs from Hick’s original model in that it makes the price level an
endogenous variable. Therefore, the model can no longer be solved without specifying a monetary
policy rule.7 Two different approaches have been adopted in the literature: (i) either specify
money-demand and money-supply equations, where the money-supply process contains a
systematic monetary policy component, or (ii) specify an interest rate rule for monetary policy.
We follow the latter approach, which is becoming increasingly popular, and where money, being
demand-determined at the interest rate set by the monetary authority, plays no role.
A typical Taylor rule formulation in this literature is:
, (7)
where  is the nominal short-term interest rate set by the central bank period to period,  the
equilibrium real interest rate (assumed to be constant),  the inﬂation target, and  the output
gap. What is immediately noticeable in this formulation is that  must be greater than 1 for the
real interest rate to be raised when the deviation of inﬂation from its target increases. It can also
be shown (King 2000) that must be greater than 1 to obtain a unique stable equilibrium. Taylor
(1993) also suggests that the central bank should lower the nominal interest rate when output is
below capacity, thus implying a positive value for .
One can also derive forward-looking speciﬁcations of the Taylor-type monetary policy rule.
Following Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), we assume that within each operating period the
central bank has a target for the nominal short-term interest rate, , that is based on the state of
7. Many studies concentrate onevaluating the optimal reaction function related to a speciﬁc model. Our
goal is rather to estimate the policy rule that the monetary authority has conducted inthe past.
it r p
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 the economy.8 The target is then a function of the expected future inﬂation9:
. (8)
Again, necessary conditions for unicity of the equilibrium is that . This speciﬁcation of the
monetary target seems to be more appropriate, given the medium-term inﬂation objective of many
industrialized countries.10 The monetary authority would not react to an actual deviation from the
target as long as it expected inﬂation to return to its target in the near future.
The policy reaction function described in (8) is still incomplete, because it assumes an immediate
adjustment of interest rates, and thus ignores the tendency of central banks to smooth changes in
interest rates.11 To take this into consideration, we add the following relationship:
, (9)
where is the monetary authorities’ actual interest rate set in period t; is an exogenous random
shock to the interest rate and . The higher is r, the higher is the degree of interest rate
smoothing. Substituting (8) into (9), we obtain (10)12:
. (10)
This is the reaction function that Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) ﬁnd characterizes German
monetary policy after 1979. They also show that this speciﬁcation works well against various
alternatives, including a backward-looking speciﬁcation. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) ﬁnd the
same kind of support for the euro area over the 1990–98 period.
8. The approach proposed by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) allows for the possibility that, within an
operating period, a central bank targets a reserve aggregate, as long as the target for reserves is based
on an implied objective for the expected short-term interest rate.
9. It is perfectly possible for current output to be unavailable at the moment the central bank chooses its
target interest rate. However, the GMM estimation methodology takes this into account.
10. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) use a one-year horizon for the
inﬂation forecasts, while other studies adopt our speciﬁcation (for example, Christiano and Rostagno
2001). It wouldbe interesting in further research to analyze the robustness of the results to different
horizons for expected inﬂation. Nevertheless, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) state that, since the
forecasts over near-term horizons are highly collinear, the results should not be sensitive to small
changes in assumed horizons.
11. SeeRudebusch(1995)forevidenceontheserialcorrelationofinterestratechanges.Oneexplanation
for this smoothing is fear of disrupting ﬁnancial markets (Goodfriend 1991); another isuncertainty
about the effectsof interest rate changes.
12. Notice that the stability condition for is the same with or without smoothing. With partial
adjustment, however, the condition no longer guarantees that the real interest rate goes up when
the expected inﬂation is rising. It only guarantees thatit will eventually go up.
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It is also possible to use the estimated value of j and r to compute a central bank’s implicit
inﬂation target, pc, over the sample. Since the constant term in (10) is ,
we easily obtain the following expression for the inﬂation target in terms of r, j, and r:
. (11)
Naturally, this implies that an assumption is made about the real long-run interest rate equilibrium
(r).13 To make this assumption, we simply use the average of the ex post real interest rate over the
sample.14
3. Estimation and Results
Given the assumption of rational expectations, equations (4), (6), and (10) imply a set of
orthogonality conditions, which provide the basis for estimating the model’s parameter by GMM
(Hansen 1982), with optimal weighting matrices that account for possible serial correlation in the
residuals. To the extent that the dimension of the vector of instruments exceeds the number of
parameters being estimated, these orthogonality conditions imply some overidentifying
restrictions that can be tested to assess the validity of our speciﬁcation as well as the set of
instruments used.
Once the model is estimated, we want to analyze the impulse-response functions of the variables.
A tricky feature of forward-looking models is that not only the endogenous variables respond to
shocks, but under rational expectations the expectations on those variables should also be
affected. Thus, we need to solve the model as a rational-expectations model, such that
expectations of future endogenous variables are conditional forecasts based on the model itself
(see Appendix A).
The speciﬁcation retained and estimated results are reported in Appendixes B and C, respectively.
The equations are estimated separately with GMM using lagged variables as instruments, over the
1983–2000 period, on a quarterly basis, based on data published by the ECB.15 We begin our
sample in the early 1980s because there is evidence of a change in the ECB’s conduct of monetary
13. We could also use the one provided by the IS curve estimation. Normally, they shouldn’t differ too
much if our model iswell speciﬁed.
14. AsnotedinClarida,Galí,andGertler(1998),byusingtheaveragerealinteresttoproxyr,theestimate
we ﬁnd for pcshould not differ toomuch from the average of p overthe sample we use.
15. The data base isconstructed by the ECB (see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre 2001). Appendix D gives the
data descriptions.
c =  (1-r) r p
c jp
c – + ()
p
c c 1 r – () r – []
1 r – () 1 j – ()
---------------------------------- =9
policy at that time: it seems that the control of inﬂation became a major focus of monetary policy
(Figure 1). We can then identify the features of monetary policy that prevailed during a period
when a policy-making commitment to reduce inﬂation was considered effective. Figure 1 plots
the rate of inﬂation, , versus nominal and real short-term interest rates,  and , respectively
(where we use  = ).
Figure 1: Inﬂation and Interest Rates for the Euro Area
Note: The ﬁgure shows annual inﬂation; the ex post real interest rate is computed with annual inﬂation.
Inﬂation is measured as the annualized quarterly increase in the harmonized prices index. The
output gap represents the difference between real output and its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁltered
series. The real interest rate is the nominal 3-month interest rate in period t minus expected
inﬂation in t+1. Most of the estimated coefﬁcients are of the expected sign and they are all (except
for the constants of the Phillips curve) signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level. Based on Hansen’s
(1982) overidentifying J-test, we cannot reject the orthogonality conditions, except in the case of
the IS equation.
3.1 The Phillips curve
The equation is estimated using as instruments past values of the output gap (one lag), inﬂation
(three lags), and the interest rate (seven lags). The coefﬁcients on the forward-looking and
backward-looking components of inﬂation are constrained to sum to one, as are the coefﬁcients
on the lagged variables for inﬂation ( ). This latter condition implies the natural rate
hypothesis. The speciﬁcation we estimate is:
pt it rt
rt it pt –















where  and  is a constant.
The size of the estimated coefﬁcient on the forward-looking component is consistent with
previous results reported in Rudebusch (2000), which have ranged from 0 to 0.6.16 Our estimation
is on the higher side, which suggests that the forward-looking component is important. A 1 per
cent increase in expected inﬂation leads to an increase in current inﬂation of 0.38 per cent. While
Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) ﬁnd a stronger expected inﬂation effect ( ),
their model does not allow for backward-looking expectations. The output-gap coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant and, more importantly, of the right sign, in contrast to some earlier ﬁndings (Galí and
Gertler 1999; Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido 2001).17
To determine the robustness of our results, we estimated the Phillips curve equation over
alternative conﬁgurations that considered one to seven lags for the three instrumental variables
(inﬂation, interest rate, and output gap), and kept only the outcomes where the coefﬁcients
associated with expected inﬂation and the output-gap terms were signiﬁcant, providing that the
overidentifying restrictions were not rejected. In all cases, the value of the output-gap coefﬁcient
was positive, lying between 0.09 and 0.19, and the expected inﬂation coefﬁcient hovered between
0.35 and 0.59. We conclude that there is no general support for the counterintuitive effect of the
output gap on inﬂation that was found in previous work.
The model is solved numerically following Fair and Taylor (1983), and consistent expectations
are calculated for the 1985Q1–2000Q4 period18 (Figure 2). Note that recent expectations are
inconsistent with the ECB’s target of below 2 per cent. The inﬂation expectations exceed 2 per
cent at the fourth quarter of 2000, which explains, in a sense, why the ECB was late to lower its
target interest rate after the easing by major central banks.
16. See Appendixes A and B for the estimation results.
17. Some other results (Gagnon and Khan 2001) suggest thatthe signof the coefﬁcientrelated tothe
output gap depends on whether a backward-looking component isincluded.
18. The model issolved simultaneously.
pt cp m + pEtpt 1 + 1 mp – () m jpptj –
j 1 =
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Figure 2: Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations for the Euro Area
We also performed rolling regressions over the 1992–2000 period to assess the possibility of
increasing price ﬂexibility following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1991). In a free-market
economy, prices signal excess demand or supply. We should thus expect that, the less regulated an
economy, the clearer the correlation between the output gap and prices. Figure 3 shows the value
of the estimated coefﬁcient related to the output gap in the Phillips curve that comes out of a
rolling regression over the period 1993–2000. This coefﬁcient follows an upward trend, which
indicates an increasing response of prices to the output gap, which in turn suggests an
increasingly ﬂexible economy.
Figure 3: Coefﬁcient apOver the Sample Period 1993–2000 (rolling regressions)








































3.2 The IS curve
To ensure stability, we impose that the coefﬁcients of the forward- and backward-looking
variables on the output gap sum to one. For this equation, the instruments used for the estimation
include the output gap lagged two periods, inﬂation lagged four periods, and the real wage lagged
two periods. The speciﬁcation estimated is the following:
, (13)
with  and . Hence, the interest rate at equilibrium is consistent with a
close output gap.
While the interest rate coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and of the right sign, it is rather small. A 1 per cent
increase in the real interest rate will lower the output gap by only 0.03 per cent. This ﬁnding
seems to be common in the literature (Rudebusch 2000). The traditional interest rate channel
seems controversial, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out: empirical studies have great
difﬁculty in identifying signiﬁcant interest rate effects on output, perhaps because monetary
policy operates through other channels (e.g., asset prices, exchange rate, credit, wealth effect)
than the short-term interest rate. Gauthier, Graham, and Liu (2003) ﬁnd evidence to support this
view.19
Following equation (13), the equilibrium real interest rate can be deﬁned as . This gives
an estimated level of the equilibrium real interest rate of 4.33 per cent, which seems a bit high.
This is a consequence of the low estimated value for . Alternatively, if we compute the average
real interest rate over the sample, assuming an ex post real interest rate (  = ), we get an
interest rate value similar to our ﬁnding. It is also consistent with the values that Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1998) ﬁnd, of 3.76 per cent for the Bundesbank from 1979 to 1994, 6.01 per cent for the
Bank of France from 1983 to 1989, and 6.94 per cent for the Bank of Italy from 1981 to 1989.20
These high levels seem to have been caused by the fact that, during those periods, central banks
were trying to reduce inﬂation by pushing up the real short-term interest rate. An implication of
those policies of high real short-term interest rates is their persistence over the period of low
19. Moreover, the rejectionof the overidentifying restrictions in the IS curve may be a sign of mis-
speciﬁcation. This is left for further work.
20. Because, prior tothe formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Bundesbank had a
strong inﬂuence on the monetary policy of France and Italy, the values of the equilibrium real rate are
computed with the inﬂation target of the Bundesbank implied (i.e., 2 percent). For the Bundesbank,
we computed the average value of the real ex post interest rate from 1979 to 1994.
xt cx q + x1E
txt 1 + qx2xt 1 – qx3xt 2 – gx it Etpt 1 + – [] – nxt ++ + =
qx3 1 qx1 q – x2 – = cx gxr =
rc x gx ¤ =
gx
rt it pt –13
inﬂation (Figure 1), in contrast to the end of the 1970s, when the real short-term interest rate of
the euro area was close to zero. The equilibrium real interest rate would probably be lower in the
future.
3.3 The monetary policy reaction function
Our main goal in this section is to estimate a representative reaction function for the monetary
authority, rather than determine the optimal response that would fall out of the model. We
estimate the monetary policy reaction-function equation using as instruments four lags for
inﬂation, two lags for the output gap, and one lag for the interest rate. The equation follows
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998). The estimated equation is as
follows:
, (14)
with , , and .
The equation ﬁts well in the sample. The central bank raises the nominal interest rate sufﬁciently
to increase the real interest rate when inﬂation deviates from its target, since the coefﬁcient
associated with expected inﬂation (corrected for the presence of smoothing) is greater than 1 (di/
(1-r) = 1.4) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. An increase in expected annualized
inﬂation of 1 per cent leads the monetary authority to raise the real interest rate by 0.4 per cent
(very close to what Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1998 ﬁnd for Germany over the 1973–94 period, but
much smaller than the estimate of Gerlach and Schnabel 2000 for the ECB over the period 1990–
98). We also ﬁnd that the central bank responds to excess demand or supply pressures: a 1 per cent
increase in the output gap leads the monetary authority to raise the real interest rate by 0.32 per
cent.21
Using the estimate of r, j,ci, and r, and using expression (11) from section 2.3, we find an estimate
of the central bank’s inﬂation target equal to 4.5. Remember from equation (14) that this estimate
requires a value for the long-run real interest rate equilibrium. The value we use (the sample
average real rate) is therefore 4.60. The estimated inﬂation target is a bit high, since the ECB’s
medium-term inﬂation target is below 2 per cent and the Bundesbank’s ofﬁcial target was 2 per
cent before EMU. Note, however, that the sample average value of inﬂation is also quite large
(3.2 per cent).
21. This issomewhat higher than the Bundesbank’sestimate of 0.25 per cent that Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1998) ﬁnd, and higher than the 0.23 percent estimate that Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) ﬁnd
for the ECB.
it ci rit 1 – diEtpt 1 + bixt + vit ++ + =
ci 1 r – () i ˜ jp
c – () = di 1 r – () j = bi 1 r – () a i =14
3.4 Model ﬁt
Using the estimated parameters and the expected values for all the variables, we calculate the
forecasted series in sample. The results are shown in Appendix E. The model tracks the historical
data rather well, though predicted inﬂation is less volatile than history. The monetary policy
reaction function gives very good results, irrespective of whether smoothing is incorporated.22
3.5  Impulse-response functions
Appendix F shows the impulse-response functions of each variable in the system to structural
shocks. Qualitatively, the results are similar to those of Rudebusch (2000), who uses survey
expectations data to proxy inﬂation expectations. A 1 per cent shock to the output gap leads to a
0.18 per cent increase in inﬂation in the ﬁrst period and inﬂation that dies off 9 to 10 periods later.
The interest rate rises initially, peaking between 4–5 quarters, before settling at its long-run value
after around 20 quarters. This high degree of persistence is a reﬂection of the large (0.90) interest-
rate-smoothing parameter.
A 1 per cent positive shock to inﬂation increases inﬂation expectations by as much as 0.3 per cent
for 3 quarters, before falling back to equilibrium (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Response of Expectations to an Inﬂation Shock
















Although the response of output to an inﬂation shock is of the right direction, it is small in
magnitude. Interest rates rise in response to an inﬂation shock for 5 to 6 quarters before easing. A
1 per cent inﬂation shock widens the output gap by only 0.01 per cent in the second and third
quarters, which then falls precipitously, undershooting its return to equilibrium for a while.
Interest rates rise in response to an inﬂation shock for 5 to 6 quarters before easing.
A 1 per cent shock to the interest rate has a negative though small impact on the output gap and on
inﬂation, as expected. The limited effect is common in structural models, in contrast to simple
VARs, perhaps because we don’t allow for interest rate dynamics in the IS curve and Phillips
curve equations. To assess monetary policy effects implied by the model, it is important to
examine the model’s empirical impulse-response functions, more speciﬁcally the effects of
monetary policy shocks to output and inﬂation. A monetary policy shock has an immediate effect
on output that peaks at 4 to 5 quarters, and a subsequent effect on inﬂation that is largest at 8 to 9
quarters. Mankiw (2000) notes that empirical NK models fail to capture these dynamics. To
reconcile NK models with the data, he suggests replacing rational expectations with adaptive
expectations in model speciﬁcations to get more realistic dynamic responses to monetary policy
actions. We have shown, however, that it is possible to ﬁnd plausible impulse-response functions
while maintaining the assumption of rational expectations by using model-consistent
expectations.
4. Conclusion
We have proposed, estimated, and solved a small structural hybrid model for the euro area.
Although the euro area did not formally exist before 1999, our aggregate estimates ﬁt the data in
the sample relatively well.
Our main ﬁndings are that: (i) the impulse-response functions implied by the model, which
combines forward- and backward-looking expectations, are consistent with the standard stylized
facts about the dynamic effects of monetary policy, and (ii) since the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty, there has been evidence that prices in Europe have increased in ﬂexibility.
In future research, it would be interesting to use a longer sample while accounting for different
inﬂation targets over time in the monetary policy rule. Further work might also be done to
improve the model’s speciﬁcation by including government expenditures, the exchange rate, and
other ﬁnancial variables through which monetary policy may operate.16
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Appendix A: Fair and Taylor’s (1983) Methodology
To solve the model as a rational-expectations model, so that expectations of future endogenous
variables are conditional forecasts based on the model itself, we follow the methodology
suggested by Fair and Taylor (1983). This method uses dynamic structure to solve rational and




The variable p in (A1) is bounded and x is an exogenous variable. We look for p0 that solves (A1)
and satisﬁes (A2). The solution is
. (A3)
The Fair-Taylor method ﬁxes T and gives a value for T+1 (assume that pT+1= 0,  for simplicity).
For this terminal value at (T+1), we have a system of (T+1) equations in the (T+1) unknowns, pT.
. (A4)
To solve the preceding system, Fair and Taylor assume that each initial guess is zero for pT,t
0. The
algorithm creates a sequence of approximations for those guesses:
. (A5)
New guesses for pT,t
j+1 are calculated by applying (A1) to the old guess of pt+1, pT,t
j. For each j,
j=1,.., T, we repeat (A1). The guesses pT,t
j+1 are based only on the pT,t
j. The Fair-Taylor method
stops when every | pT,t
j+1 - pT,t
j|  is less than a prespeciﬁed convergence criteria. Note that the
solution does not depend on the T chosen. For details, see Fair and Taylor (1983) and Judd (1998).


















with  and  as a constant.
: Inﬂation in period t;
: a measure of the output gap in period t.
: the period t expectation of inﬂation in period t+1;
: a structural error in the Phillips curve.
B.2 IS curve
, (B2)
with  and where the constant represents: .
: The long-run equilibrium real interest rate;
: the nominal short-run interest rate;
: a structural error in the IS curve.
B.3 Reaction function
, (B3)
with ,  and .
: A structural error in the reaction function;
: the long-run equilibrium nominal interest rate.
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Appendix C: Estimation Results1
Table C1: Phillips Curve
Table C2: IS Equation
Table C3: Reaction-Function Equation
























Appendix D: Data Descriptions
All data are quarterly time series. The data for the period from 1983Q1 to 1998Q4 are taken from
the data base constructed by the ECB (Fagan, Henry, and Mestre 2001). We extend the sample to
2000Q4 using the associated recent data published in the ECB’s monthly bulletin. Note that
historical revisions of the data were incorporated in the sample.
Price inﬂation is measured as the annualized quarterly growth rate of the harmonized index of
consumer prices (HICP):
.
The models have been estimated using non-seasonally adjusted data. One of the referees has
asked that an HICP be used, seasonally adjusted; however, none were available. Using a year-
over-year series would have meant altering the calculations of the real interest rate, which is
quarterly, and the impulse responses would have been hard to interpret because there would have
been an MA process embedded in the residuals.
Wage inﬂation is measured as the annualized quarterly growth rate of compensation by
employees:
with .
Real GDP is .
The output gap is measured as the real GDP deviating from its potential (HP ﬁlter with a lambda
equal to 1600): .
The nominal short-run interest rate is .
pt 100 HICPt () ln HICPt 1 – () ln – () 4 ×× =




yt 100 YERt () ln =
xt yt yt – =
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Appendix E: Observed and Forecasted Series
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